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Abstract. This article describes several psychological phenomena that can impede resolutions of political 
conflict. 
 
Two sides to a political dispute have begun to see their way towards resolution. Rationally and logically 
the sides purport tolerance of some compromise affecting economic, military, or other assets. However, 
the deal in the making may suddenly be derailed. Side 1 suddenly professes to be appalled by the loss of 
degrees of freedom that the compromise entails. To Side 1, this loss seems to be coerced by Side 2. 
Moreover, Side 1 professes that if the compromise is implemented as it now stands, observers to the 
dispute and its resolution will perceive that Side 1 was unduly influenced by Side 2. This appearance 
must not occur, and as long as the impending resolution seems to ineluctably induce it, the deal is off. 
Moreover, to Side 1 an acceptable deal may now look almost like the opposite of what it appeared to be 
only moments before. 
 
Reactance is the term scientific psychology attributes to clusters of thoughts, feelings, motives, and 
behaviors that share in common (1) a reaction against a direction of others and (2) a resultant prime to 
desire or act in accordance with something vary different than what seems to be directed. A 
combination of freedom of choice, nonconformity, behavioral freedom, and aversiveness to advice--
especially in public environments--seems to constitute reactance psychology. Causal attributions are 
clusters of thoughts, feelings, motives, and behaviors that make up explanations of why various events 
occur. 
 
Once reactance occurs in a public diplomatic process, it’s almost as if the other side has to restart not 
only back at the beginning but even further back. (However, the more astute “other side” may plan on 
inducing reactance after that side has championed a resolution opposite to what was is really desired. 
Here, reactance may be a positive development.) 
 
The spatial and temporal contiguity of relevant variables can be modified to develop causal attributions 
in observers consonant with one’s desires. For example, the closer in location and time two variables 
are, the more likely they may be perceived to be causally related. (More recent research has identified 
spatial and temporal differences that may imply causality as well as similarities both of context and 
variable characteristics.) 
 
The abstractness of the above quickly becomes concrete in the world of public diplomacy. Officials of 
the People’s Republic of China do not want it to appear that freeing prisoners is being dictated by the 
United States of America (USA) and various human rights organizations. Neither do officials of Israel or 
the Palestinian National Authority--although either side may profess attributions of being forced by 
others into taking an action, when that action would otherwise be unthinkable if free will was perceived 
by others as the causal factor. During the Cuban missile crisis, officials of the USA needed to avoid the 
appearance that removal of Soviet missiles would require a quid pro quo--the removal of US missiles 
from Turkey. Purported violations or threats to violate one’s sovereignty are high probability inducers of 
reactance and heightened sensitivity concerning causal attributions. 
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However, psychological research on reactance and causal attributions can only provide general 
guidelines in managing specific situations. The nomothetic knowledge of research studies usually pales 
before the ideographic requirements of high-stakes diplomacy. At present, such research can help 
decisionmakers ask the right questions, even if the right answers are much more of a gamble. (See 
Hong, S., & Page, S. (1989). A psychological reactance scale: Development, factor structure, and 
reliability. Psychological Reports, 64, 1323-1326; Nail, P. R., Van Leeuwen, M. D., & Powell, A B. (1996). 
The effectance versus the self-presentational view of reactance: Are important ratings influenced by 
anticipated surveillance? Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 11, 573-584; Nario, M. R., & 
Branscombe, N. R. (1995). Comparison processes in hindsight and causal attribution. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 1244-1255; Schwarz, N. (1984). When reactance effects persist despite 
restoration of freedom: Investigations of time delay and vicarious control. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 14, 405-419; Van Overwalle, F. (1997). A test of the joint model of causal attribution. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 27, 221-236.) (Keywords: Causal Attribution, Decisionmaking, 
Negotiation, Public Diplomacy, Reactance.) 
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